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175 pilli and Ahuitzotl began the grisly work of tearing out the
796 victims' hearts. Lesser dignitaries succeeded each other according to rank, until the awful immolation was completed.[13]

175 Ahuitzotl's military campaigns extended south into Guatemala and as far north as the Huaxteca in Vera Cruz. He was
● [669] constantly engaged in putting down revolts, especially in Puebla, where the Tlaxcalans* and Cholulans had resisted Tenochcan domination. His capital, meanwhile, had grown so enormously that he had to construct another aqueduct, a fact which indicates that sheer pressure of population was an important cause for the military exploits of Tenochtitlan.
[731] An unusually disastrous flood beset the city in 1503, so that Ahuitzotl had to send to Texcoco for aid in restoring the dikes. While superintending these public works he received a head injury which proved fatal. Ahuitzotl's personality was strong and vicious. He was passionately fond of war, being a vindictive and relentless foe. Likewise he had those traits which so often accompany military character, lust for women and fondness for display.

The luckless Montezuma II, surnamed Xocoyotzin† (the Younger), son of Axayacatl, succeeded his uncle. Not only had he to keep the conquered tribes in order, but also he had constantly to provide captives for sacrifice. This bloody cult, which to the Tenochcan mind had brought such eminence,
[782] had to be maintained lest disaster ensue. He approached his uncle's piety on one occasion when twelve thousand captives from a rebel province in Oaxaca were delivered up to the War God.[14]

The last New Fire Ceremony took place in 1507. The years immediately preceding, with their threat of an ending

*Tlash-ca'-lans. †Sho-coy-ot-se'en.

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FIG. 6. Aztec sorcerers, sent from the highland, offer bewitched food to Cortes and his staff, who disdain the viands. *Codex Florentino*

[726] foreign to Indian principles of war. The simple Indian methods of mass attack were of little avail against the maneuvering of a well-drilled force, for the native tactics could only bring the merest fraction of their fighting force in direct contact with the enemy.

[754] The Spaniards also resisted witchcraft on the occasion when Montezuma seriously applied it. However, sorcery, according to native standards, was at best a two-edged weapon, so that it is doubtful if this failure had any other than a confirmatory bearing on the Indian attitude of mind toward the supernatural quality of the Spaniards. The problem that beset Montezuma was not that the invaders were themselves gods, but that they were the symbols, the vicars on earth, as it were, of vast unearthly forces bent on establishing a new social order. As such the Spaniards required the most gingerly handling.[8] (See Fig. 6.)

175 When the Spaniards were approaching the capital a politi-
669 cal problem entered to complicate the spiritual one. The

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city-states, or pueblos, between the Valley of Mexico and the coast were independent communities and, even if tributary to the Valley powers, were often reluctantly so. Therefore, many of these tribes, like the Totonacs, welcomed the invaders as the spearhead for an open revolt. Others, like the completely independent and warlike Tlaxcalans, put the power of Cortes to a practical test in open battle and, when the Spaniards won, became the most loyal of Cortes' supporters. Cholula, a large town loosely allied to the Aztecs, met the Spaniards as friends, plotting to overcome them by treachery, a good Indian political maneuver instigated, perhaps, by Montezuma. The Spaniards, suspecting such a move, counteracted its efficacy by a judiciously executed massacre, thus, if not gaining a friendly community, at least creating a noncombatant one. (See Figs. 7–9.)

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Montezuma and his more cautious counselors watched this

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Fig. 7. Cortes and his army, on passing the great volcanoes southeast of Mexico City, ask the way. Note the smoke issuing from the crater of Popocatepetl. *Codex Florentino*

16:Bandelier E-4 (no date)1880 NU7 Aztec NU7

nations of those by whom he was surrounded and to report forth-[648] with any suspicious movements or utterances that came to his[651] notice. Thus he appeared, in the eyes of the people among whom he resided, as a spy, whose reports might, at any time, bring down upon them the wrath of their conquerors. Again, it was his duty to control the bringing in of the articles promised as tribute, at stated times. Consequently he was the hateful tax-gatherer, the living monument of their defeat with all its unfortu-

los Señores de Mexico tenian puesto un gobernador llamado Petlacalcatl, aunque en cada un pueblo tenian puesto un Calpixque, que es como Mayordomo, que tenian á cargo de hacer recojer las rentas y tributos que los dichos Señores tributaban al Señorio de México y todos los dichos mayordomos acudian al dicho Petlacalcatl, como su governador;" (plates XXII and XXIII): " . . . . tenian puestos Calpixques, en cada uno de ellos, y en lo mas principal dominaba sobre todos ellos un governador, para que los mantubiese en paz y justicia, y les hiciese cumplir sus tributos y porque no se rebelasen;" (plates XXIV and XXV): "Y á que fuesen bien regidos y governados, los Señores de Mexico en cada uno de ellos tenian puestos Calpixques, y sobre todos los Calpixques un governador, persona principal de México, y asi mismo los Calpixques eran Mexicanos, lo qual se hacia é probeya por los dichos Señores y á seguridad, para que no les rebelasen, y á que les administrasen justicia y oyesen en policia." It follows from the above that the "Governors" were placed, not so much over the tribes, as over the "calpixca" themselves, and indeed the "Petlacalcatl," "man of the house of chests," was the head-steward, to whom all the other stewards had to direct their consignments of tribute. Consequently, it is not to be understood as "governor of a province," but only "governor of the stewards," which is totally different.

Besides, there is positive evidence to the effect, that the Mexicans and their associates never interfered with the autonomy of tributary tribes. *Andrés de Tapia* ("*Relacion*," etc., p. 583): "Los que tomaba de guerra decian tequitin tlacotlo, que quiere decir, tributan como esclavos. En estos ponia mayordomos y recogedores y recaudadores; y aunque los señores mandaban su gente, era debajo de la mano destos de México. . . . *Durán* ("*Rapport*," etc., p. 68): "Les chefs, restant seigneurs comme avant la guerre, conservaient la juridiction civile et criminelle dans toute l'étendue de leurs domaines."

When the tribes of the gulf coast (the Totonacas, etc.) arose against the Mexicans, [669] murdering the stewards who had been placed among them, they were speedily overcome again, and when they attributed their revolt to the intrigues of their head-chiefs, asking the Mexicans to punish them for it, the Mexicans replied, according to *Durán* (Cap. XXIV, p. 204): "nosotros no traemos autoridad para matar á nadie sino es en guerra: vuestros señores no han parecido en esta guerra ni los emos visto, pero no por eso se escaparán, pues vuestras razones y deseo y lo que pedis, se dirá al rey nuestro señor Montezuma, y él mandará que se execute lo que nosotros dexaremos ordenado, y luego sin mas dilacion los traed aqui á todos ante nosotros y á muy buen recaudo." Afterwards: "enviaron á Cuaunochtli y á Tlilancalqui, que eran de los mayores oydores del consejo supremo, para que executasen aquella justicia." The two chiefs were cruelly butchered (p. 206). This story is also related by *Tezozomoc* (Cap. XXXV, pp. 55 and 56), and it is evidently the instance referred to and illustrated by the *Codex Mendoza* (plate LXVII). The foregoing tells us that even in a case of dangerous treachery and rebellion such as the above, the Mexicans did not claim the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the conquered tribe, of their own accord, but that it required the positive request of that tribe to cause them to act in the premises. Furthermore, the position of the "chief of men" as military executor is clearly defined: "y él mandará que se execute lo que nosotros dexaremos ordenado." A very important statement!